# Hacking IOT devices using JTAG

HiTB 2024 – Hardware Village



1. What is JTAG?

- 2. Discovering a JTAG interface
- 3. Identifying JTAG pinout
- 4. Dumping firmware via JTAG
- 5. Challenges & Future works

## What is JTAG?

- JTAG is the name used for the IEEE 1149.1 standard entitled Standard Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture for test access ports (TAP) used for testing printed circuit boards (PCB) using boundary scan
- Processors often use JTAG to provide access to their debug/emulation functions and all FPGAs and CPLDs use JTAG to provide access to their programming functions



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# JTAG does not have standardized connection pinout. You might want to use a JTAGulator to bruteforce & verify the pinout



## No Pin labels

No Philabels
 No Chip information



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# JTAGulator supports IDCODE scan & BYPASS scan to bruteforce the JTAG pinout

### What is a JTAGulator?

 JTAGulator is an open-source hardware tool that assists in identifying OCD (On-Chip Debug) interfaces from test points, vias, component pads, or connectors on a target device.

#### What is a IDCODE scan?

#### **Expected results**

Identified TDO, TCK, TMS pins

#### Under the hood

 JTAGulator continuously send IDCODE command over the assumed pinout, until device identifier information is returned

#### What is a BYPASS scan?

#### **Expected results**

Identified TDI, TDO, TCK, TMS pins

#### Under the hood

 JTAGulator continuously send BYPASS command to the assumed pinout, until the same data input into TDI returned from TDO



# Identifying pinout with JTAGulator (Part 1) – Identify ground pin(s) using multimeter

| Pre-<br>requisites | <ul> <li>Multi-meter</li> <li>Physical access to the target device</li> </ul>   |        |
|--------------------|---|--------|
| Step 1             | Power off the target device for:<br>- safe test<br>- accurate measurement<br>- avoiding damage to circuit board & meter             |        |
| Step 2             | Touch the black probe on a known ground (USB port case, power button case)  |        |
| Step 3             | Touch the red probe with each JTAG pin<br>- the ones which form a circuit in the <b>continuity test</b> is the GND pin (give beep s | sound) |

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## Identifying pinout with JTAGulator (Part 2) – Connect the pins with JTAGulator

| Step 1 Conn<br>GND | ect <b>one GND from the device</b> to JTAGulator's  |  |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Step 2             | ect the rest of the device's pins to the<br><b>nel pins</b> of JTAGulator<br>ake sure you can trace back the channel pins |  |







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## Identifying pinout with JTAGulator (Part 3) – Run IDCODE scan on JTAGulator

| Pre-<br>requisites | <ul><li>JTAGulator</li><li>Laptops (Ubuntu 20.04 or above is preferred)</li></ul>   |  |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Step 1             | Connect the JTAGulator to laptop over USB cable<br>- open console access to JTAGulator via command:<br>screen /dev/USBtty0 115200   | JTAG> I<br>Enter starting channel [0]:<br>Enter ending channel [7]:<br>Possible permutations: 336  |
| Step 2             | <ul> <li>Start IDCODE scan first with below commands</li> <li>enter JTAG mode with "J"</li> <li>set target device's voltage level with "V"</li> <li>initiate IDCODE with "I"</li> <li>configure bruteforce channels</li> <li>(channel 0-12 connected in previous part)</li> </ul> | Bring channels LOW before each permutation? [Y/n]:<br>Enter length of time for channels to remain LOW (in ms, 1 - 1000) [100]:<br>Enter length of time after channels return HIGH before proceeding (in ms, 1 - 1000) [100]:<br>Press spacebar to begin (any other key besides Enter to abort)<br>JTAGulating! Press any key to abort<br>TDI: N/A<br>TDO: 4<br>TCK: 2<br>TMS: 3<br>Device ID #1: 0000 000000000000000000000000000000 |
| Step 3             | Wait for the results of TDO, TCK, TMS   | IDCODE scan complete.<br>JTAG>   |

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## Identifying pinout with JTAGulator (Part 4) – Run BYPASS scan on JTAGulator

| P<br>re | Pre-<br>equisites | <ul> <li>JTAGulator</li> <li>Laptops (Ubuntu 20.04 or above is preferred)</li> </ul>  |   |
|---------|-------------------|---|---|
| S       | tep 1             | <ul> <li>Start BYPASS scan with below commands</li> <li>enter JTAG mode with "J"</li> <li>set target device's voltage level with "V"</li> <li>initiate BYPASS scan with "B"</li> <li>configure bruteforce channels</li> <li>(channel 0-12 connected in previous part)</li> <li>configure known pins to speed up the scan</li> </ul> | <pre>JTAG&gt; B<br/>Enter starting channel [0]:<br/>Enter ending channel [12]:<br/>Are any pins already known? [Y/n]:<br/>Enter X for any unknown pin.<br/>Enter TDI pin [0]: X<br/>Enter TDO pin [4]:<br/>Enter TOO pin [4]:<br/>Enter TKS pin [3]:<br/>Possible permutations: 10<br/>Bring channels LOW before each permutation? [Y/n]:<br/>Enter length of time for channels to remain LOW (in ms, 1 - 1000) [100]:<br/>Enter length of time after channels return HIGH before proceeding (in ms, 1 - 1000) [100]:<br/>Press spacebar to begin (any other key besides Enter to abort)<br/>JTAGulating! Press any key to abort<br/><br/>TDI: 5<br/>TDO: 4</pre> |
| S       | tep 2             | Wait for the results of TDI, TDO, TMS, TCK  | TCK: 2<br>TMS: 3<br>Number of devices detected: 1<br><br>BYPASS scan complete.<br>JTAG>   |

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## **Connecting to JTAG**





**Bus Pirate** 

- Price: 30 60 USD
- Pros:

- Support wide range of protocols (JTAG, SPI, I2C, UART, etc)

Cons:

Relatively slowcompared to dedicatedJTAG debuggers

**ST-Link v2** ■ **Price:** 13 – 46 USD

- Pros:
   Cost Effective for JTAG debugging
- Cons:
   Only compatible with
- STM32 devices (most cases)

- J-LINK v9 Price: ~450 USD
- Pros:

   High performance with wide compatibility
- Cons:

- Expensive for high-end version, e.g., commercial



JTAGulator Price: 90 - 200 USD

- Pros:
   Specializes in identifying JTAG/ UART pinouts
- Cons:
  - Limited functions in JTAG debugging

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## Extracting firmware over JTAG (Part 1) – Upgrade the bus pirate version for JTAG & OpenOCD

| Pre-<br>requisites | <ul> <li>Bus Pirate v3.x</li> <li>Bus Pirate firmware version 6.1 r1676/ 6.0 r1625</li> <li>Laptops (Ubuntu 20.04 or above is preferred)</li> </ul>  |  |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Step 1             | <b>## Download the firmware repository</b><br>git clone https://github.com/DangerousPrototypes/Bus_Pirate.git<br>cd Bus_Pirate-master/BPv3-bootloader/pirate-loader                                      |  |
| Step 2             | <pre>## Enter the bus pirate screen /dev/ttyUSB0 115200 ## Enter bootloader mode in the bus pirate \$ ## Kill the screen session to prevent the connection occupied Press the keys: Ctrl + A, k, y</pre> | HiZ>\$<br>Are you sure? y<br>BOOTLOADER  |
| Step 3             | <b>## Flash the new firmware v6.1</b><br>./pirate-loader_lnxdev=/dev/ttyUBS0hex=//package/BPv3-<br>firmware/old-versions/BPv3-frimware-v6.1.hex  | HiZ>i<br>Bus Pirate v3.5<br>Firmware v6.1 r1676 Bootloader v4.4                      |
| Step 4             | ## Verify the firmware version in the bus pirate terminal<br>i   | DEVID:0x0447 REVID:0x3046 (24FJ64GA002 B8)<br>http://dangerousprototypes.com<br>HiZ> |

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## Extracting firmware over JTAG (Part 2) – Connect the bus pirate to the JTAG interface

Step 1

TDI (MOSI) <-> TDI TCK (CLK) <-> TCK TMS (CS) <-> TMS TDO (MISO) <-> TDO

GND <-> GND

**Connect the Pins as identified:** 

Bus Pirate <-> Target JTAG interface

Bus pirate pin translation table

| Mode   | MOSI | CLK   | MISO | CS  |
|--------|------|-------|------|-----|
| HiZ    |      |       |      |     |
| 1-Wire | OWD  |       |      |     |
| UART   | TX   |       | RX   |     |
| I2C    | SDA  | SCL   |      |     |
| SPI    | MOSI | CLOCK | MISO | CS  |
| JTAG   | TDI  | TCK   | TDO  | TMS |



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## Extracting firmware over JTAG (Part 3) – Connect to the JTAG using openOCD

| Step 1   | <pre>## Install openocd, if not<br/>sudo apt get install libtool autoconf texinfo libusb-dev libftdi-dev screen -y<br/>git clone git://git.code.sf.net/p/openocd/code<br/>./bootstrap<br/>./configureenable-maintainer-modedisable-werrorenable-buspirate</pre>  |
|--|--|
| Step 2   | ## Open JTAG connection via Openocd<br>## openocd config in next slide as appendix<br>openocd -f MyBuspirate -f ath79.cfg  |
| <pre>srlabs@srlabs:~/ Open On-Chip Deb Licensed under O For bug reports,</pre> | <pre>Workspace/device-testing/tp-link-ac1750v2\$ openocd -f MyBuspirate.cfg -f /usr/local/share/openocd/scripts/interface/ath79.cfg upugger 0.12.0+dev-00663-g16c114c05 (2024-08-26-16:03) NU CPL v2 , read openocd.org/doc/doxygen/bugs.html ) on port 6666 for tcl connections ) on port 6666 for tcl connections ) on port 4444 for telnet connections 2 JTAG Interface ready! 2 adapter "buspirate" doesn't support configurable speed 3 ath79.cpu tap/device found: 0x00000001 (mfg: 0x0000 (<invalid>), part: 0x0000, ver: 0x0) NU Examination succeed NU starting gdb server on 3333 ) on port 3333 for gdb connections ) on port 3333 for gdb connections ) telnet' connection on tcp/4444</invalid></pre> |

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# Appendix – Extracting firmware over JTAG (Part 3) – openOCD config

## ath79.cfg [1]

```
# Atheros ATH79 MIPS SoC.
# tested on AP83 and AP99 reference board
#
# source: https://forum.openwrt.org/viewtopic.php?pid=297299#p297299
```

```
if { [info exists CHIPNAME] } {
   set _CHIPNAME $CHIPNAME
} else {
   set _CHIPNAME ath79
}
```

```
if { [info exists ENDIAN] } {
   set _ENDIAN $ENDIAN
} else {
   set _ENDIAN big
}
```

```
if { [info exists CPUTAPID] } {
   set _CPUTAPID $CPUTAPID
} else {
   set _CPUTAPID 0x00000001
}
```

jtag\_ntrst\_assert\_width 200 jtag\_ntrst\_delay 1

reset\_config trst\_only

jtag newtap \$\_CHIPNAME cpu -irlen 5 -ircapture 0x1 -irmask 0x1f -expected-id \$\_CPUTAPID

set \_TARGETNAME \$\_CHIPNAME.cpu target create \$\_TARGETNAME mips\_m4k -endian \$\_ENDIAN -chain-position \$\_TARGETNAME

\$\_TARGETNAME configure -event reset-init {
 # disable flash remap
 mww 0xbf000004 0x43

```
}
```

# serial SPI capable flash # flash bank <driver> <base> <size> <chip\_width> <bus\_width> set \_FLASHNAME \$\_CHIPNAME.flash flash bank \$\_FLASHNAME ath79 0xbf000000 0x01000000 0 0 \$\_TARGETNAME

#### MyBuspirate.cfg

source [find /usr/local/share/openocd/scripts/interface/buspirate.cfg] buspirate port /dev/ttyUSB0 Transport select jtag

[1] https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/hardware/debrick.ath79.using.jtag#ath79cfg

## Extracting firmware over JTAG (Part 4) – Halt the device before firmware extraction

| Step 1              | <pre>## Telnet to openocd server telnet localhost 4444 ## check the target chip's state targets</pre>   |          |        |  |   |  |  |  |                           |  |
|---------------------|---|----------|--------|--|---|--|--|--|---------------------------|--|
| > targets<br>Target | Name  | Туре     | Endian | TapName  | State   |  |  |  |                           |  |
| 0* ath79.           | сри   | mips_m4k | big    | ath79.cpu  | runnin  | g  |  |  |                           |  |
| Step 2              | th79.cpu       mips_m4k       big       ath79.cpu         ## Spam the halt command to halt the CPU       halt       halt         ## Pause until you see two halt implemented and the state is steadily halted from "targets" output       - Sometimes you can only halt the CPU in the beginning of the system boot up         - Half-successful halt will trigger system reboot. Not a permanent halt       - Half-successful halt will trigger system reboot. |          |        | <pre>&gt; halt<br/>processor id not avai<br/>isa info not availabl<br/>target halted in MIPS<br/>&gt; halt<br/>ISA implemented: MIPS<br/>DSP implemented: MIPS<br/>DSP implemented: no<br/>target halted in MIPS<br/>&gt; halt<br/>&gt; halt &gt; halt<br/>&gt; halt &gt; halt<br/>&gt; halt &gt; halt</pre> | lable, faile<br>e, failed to<br>32 mode due<br>32, MIPS16,<br>rev 2<br>32 mode due<br>32 mode due | ed to read<br>read cp<br>to debug<br>release<br>to debug | d cp0 PRId regis<br>0 config registe<br>-request, pc: 0><br>2(AR=1)<br>-request, pc: 0><br>TapName | ster<br>er: 0<br>(80109254<br>(80109254<br>(80109254 |                           |  |
|                     |   |          |        |  | 0* ath79.cpu<br>> targets<br>TargetName<br><br>0* ath79.cpu                                       | mips_m4k<br>Type<br><br>mips_m4k                         | big<br>Endian<br><br>big   | ath79.cpu<br>TapName<br>ath79.cpu                    | halted<br>State<br>halted |  |

# Extracting firmware over JTAG (Part 5) – Dump the firmware

| Step 1   | <pre>## Identify the flash memory location &amp; size [1] flash banks</pre>   |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| Step 2   | ## Identify the flash chip device name (optional)<br>flash probe 0  | Footnotes [1]  |  |  |
| Step 3   | <b>## Extract the firmware based on the offset identified in step 1</b><br>dump_image <output filename=""> 0xbf000000 0x0100000</output>  | <ul> <li>Flash banks are pre-define<br/>in the target chip's config</li> </ul>       |  |  |
| <pre>&gt; flash bank #0 : ath79.f &gt; flash prob Found flash flash 'ath79 &gt; dump_image No working m not enough w No working a Falling back</pre> | s<br>lash (ath79) at 0xbf000000, size 0x01000000, buswidth 0, chipwidth 0<br>e 0<br>device 'win w25q128fv/jv' (ID 0x001840ef)<br>' found at 0xbf000000<br>ac1750v2_firmware.bin 0xbf000000 0x01000000<br>emory available. Specify -work-area-phys to target.<br>orking area available(requested 128)<br>rea available<br>to non-bulk read   | <ul> <li>file (ath79.cfg)</li> <li>Without the config, it will not work ☺</li> </ul> |  |  |
| Step 4   | <pre>## Verify the image is being dumped srlabs@srlabs:~/Workspace/device-testing/tp-link-ac1750v2\$ while true; do ls -l ac1750v2_firmware.bin ;sleep 60; done -rw-rw-r 1 srlabs srlabs 0 Aug 26 16:40 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-r 1 srlabs srlabs 0 Aug 26 16:40 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-r 1 srlabs srlabs 4096 Aug 26 16:42 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-r 1 srlabs srlabs 4096 Aug 26 16:42 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-r 1 srlabs srlabs 4096 Aug 26 16:42 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-r 1 srlabs srlabs 4096 Aug 26 16:42 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-re- 1 srlabs srlabs 4096 Aug 26 16:42 ac1750v2_firmware.bin -rw-rw-re- 1 srlabs srlabs 4096 Aug 26 16:42 ac1750v2_firmware.bin</pre> |  |  |  |

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The journey of JTAG hacking doesn't end here yet... Some challenges need more effort to work around

| Challenge                                    | Impact   | Why this challenge happens?  |
|--|--|--|
| Obtain chip<br>specification<br>(data sheet) | <ul> <li>Unable to craft openocd config         <ul> <li>Cannot connect the JTAG interface via OpenOCD</li> </ul> </li> <li>Chip's details are in the datasheet, e.g. bus width, chip width, memory mapping</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Manufacturer does not publish all their chip's specification</li> </ul> |
|  | F  | Potential workaround   |
| -  | An automotive brute-force approach to identify chi<br>(See next slide)   | ip specification   |

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# The essential components of OpenOCD config files are bruteforceable

| Essential config<br>components                           | <ul> <li>Bytes order         <ul> <li>Big-endian value</li> <li>CPUTAPID</li> <li>Retrievable f</li> </ul> </li> <li>Instruction Reference</li> <li>Common content</li> <li>4-bit for simple</li> <li>Flash memory</li> <li>ath79: 0xbf0</li> <li>Flash memory</li> <li>identifiable value</li> </ul> | S Little-endia<br>rom IDCODE<br>gister Lengt<br>ofiguration k<br>ole devices,<br>offset<br>ues based o<br>00000/ 0x10<br>osize<br>via physical i | an<br>E scan<br>t <b>h</b><br>based on chip architectur<br>5-bit for Cortex-M, 7-bit for<br>n flash driver – readily av<br>0000000/ 0x20000000; m<br>nspection on the flash ch | e, e.g.<br>for ARM cores, etc<br>vailable on OpenOCD page, e<br>nrvlqspi: 0x46010000; etc<br>nip (refer to our SPI flash hac | e.g.<br>:king!!)                                    |
|--|---|--|--|--|---|
| Hypothetical autom                                       | nation steps  |  |  |  |   |
| 1<br>Populate the config<br>files for bruteforce         | 2<br>Spawning o<br>with new co  | penocd<br>onfig files  | 3<br>Validate config by<br>some means<br>(to be researched)  | 4 Extract firmware with the few potential legitimate config  | 5 Extract and search file system from the firmwares |
| To answer after<br>implementation &<br>Security Research | research<br>h Labs  | <ul> <li>Any es</li> <li>Will the</li> </ul>   | sential components for<br>e bruteforce time be ac  | gotten?<br>ceptable?   | 22  |