

Hacking IOT devices using SPI flash

HiTB 2024 – Hardware Village



Security
Research
Labs

-
- ▶ 1. What is SPI flash memory?
 2. Identifying flash memory
 3. Target selection
 4. Dumping flash memory
 5. Modifying filesystems
 6. Writing filesystem back to chip
 7. Getting a root shell
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What is SPI flash memory?

What is it?

SPI flash memory, also known as flash memory, has become widely used in the embedded industry and is commonly used for storage and data transfer in portable devices.


Where's it found?

Common devices include phones, tablets, and media players, as well as industrial devices such as security systems and medical products.

How is it used in IOT devices?

The flash memory is non-volatile, meaning that it retains its stored data when the device is powered down.

Typically, a SOC will contain a first-stage bootloader which will invoke a second-stage bootloader (U-boot) stored in the flash memory. Additional filesystems are also stored in flash memory, which normally contain vendor binaries and configuration scripts for device operation.



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Identifying flash memory

Physical characteristics

Serial Flash Memory is available in many packages. One of the most common packages is SOP8 (see right).

Vendor identification

Look for the logo, common vendors in the IOT space are GigaDevice, Winbond, Puya.


Part numbers

Vendor names/logos as well as part numbers are typically printed on the top-side.

Datasheets

Using Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) aka Google, we can lookup the part number of the packages to locate their data sheet.

Top tip: Check out alldatasheet.com





25Q32JVS1Q
family size (m-bit)



25Q16CS1Q
family size (m-bit)


Identifying flash memory – Flash memory datasheets

Flash memory specifications can *often* be found with a quick Google search for the product part number printed on to the surface of the chip



3.2 Pin Descriptions

No.	Symbol	Extension	Remarks
1	CS#		Chip select
2	SO	SIO1	Serial data output for 1 x I/O Serial data input and output for 2 x I/O read mode
3	WP#	-	Write protection active low
4	GND	-	Ground of the device
5	SI	SIO0	Serial data input for 1x I/O Serial data input and output for 2 x I/O read mode
6	SCLK	-	Serial interface clock input
7	HOLD#	-	To pause the device without deselecting the device
8	Vcc	-	Power supply of the device



8-PIN SOP (150mil/208mil) and TSSOP

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Target Selection

Target Selection

IPcams are a good place to start when getting into IOT hacking as they are very affordable and offer a large attack surface

Common Attack Surface

- UART serial
- SPI flash memory
- Network traffic between IPcam and cloud
- Network traffic between Mobile app and cloud
- Network traffic between IPcam and mobile app
- Mobile app decompilation

Before you buy

Check for FCC submissions. Vendors selling wireless capable products in the the US are required to register their products with FCC. These normally include submitting **user manuals, technical specifications and teardown images of the device internals.** These are very helpful creating a threat model to determine the attack surface of the device and whether it is a suitable candidate for security research.



blurams Pet Camera 2K, Indoor Camera, Dog Camera, 360° Home Security Camera, WiFi Baby Monitor, Night Vision, Motion Tracking, 2-Way Talk, Cloud&SD, APP Control, Works with...
★★★★☆ ~ 24,895
1K+ bought in past month
Limited time deal
£19²⁴ RRP: £29.99
Buy 2, Save 5% on every 1
FREE delivery Sun, 7 Jul on your first eligible order to UK or Ireland
Or fastest delivery Tomorrow, 5 Jul
Works with Alexa
Add to basket
More buying choices
£19.05 (2 used & new offers)

FCC documents: <https://fccid.io/2ASQA-A31>



Imou 2K WiFi Security Camera Indoor Pet Dog Baby Camera with AI Human/Motion/Sound Detection, 360° Wireless IP Home Security Camera, Smart Tracking, Siren, Night Vision, 2-Way...
★★★★☆ ~ 9,097
1K+ bought in past month
£19⁴⁸
10% off promotion available
FREE delivery Sun, 7 Jul on your first eligible order to UK or Ireland
Or fastest delivery Tomorrow, 5 Jul
Works with Alexa
Add to basket

FCC documents: <https://fcc.report/FCC-ID/2AVYF-IPC-TAX2C/>




Little elf Smart Camera, Litokam 2K Indoor Security Camera with 360° Motion Tracking, Pet Camera Night Vision, [2024 New] House Cameras for Pet/Nanny, WiFi Camera Two-...
★★★★☆ ~ 7,606
1K+ bought in past month
Limited time deal
£24⁹⁸ RRP: £32.99
Save £2.00 with voucher
FREE delivery Fri, 30 Aug on your first eligible order to UK or Ireland
Or fastest delivery Tomorrow, 28 Aug
Works with Alexa
Add to basket

FCC documents: <https://fccid.io/2AK47LF-P1>

Target Selection – FCC documents

From FCC submitted documents it is possible to gain insights as to the possible attack surfaces present on the target device ahead of purchase



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Dumping flash memory – tooling requirements

SPI flash can be read/written from devices with an SPI interface, these range in price and availability. If you are on a budget, you can use existing hardware you have lying around or purchase specialist hardware to increase reliability.

Development Boards



Arduino



Raspberry Pi

Multi-tools




Bus Pirate



Flipper Zero

Dedicated Programmers



**CH341A
Programmer**



Xgecu T56

Dumping flash memory – connecting to SOP8 chip



SOP8 Test clip / PCB probes

Pros

Flash memory can be extracted without removing the chip from the board

Cons

Reading (worse writing) via the chip can be unreliable as the chip reader may power up the SOC via the VCC rail

SOP8 to DIP8 socket

Pros



Flash memory can be read/written with high success rate

Cons


Chip needs to be removed from board with hot air/soldering iron

Dumping flash memory – attaching the chip to the programmer device

To remove the requirement of desoldering the chip, a wiring harness been soldered to the pads and connect to a SOP8 > DIP8 socket



Disconnect DIP8 socket from wiring harness and place in the Xgeco programmer



Dumping flash memory – Detecting the SOP8 chip in Xgpro



Launch Xgpro software

Using wine, we can run the Windows binary on Linux

```
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~  
pentest@hitb-hv-1:~$ wine ~/.wine/drive_c/Xgpro/Xgpro.exe
```

Detect the flash memory chip


1. Click “Auto” on the top menu
2. Click “Detect” in the Auto Search window
3. Select the highlighted Model
4. Click the “Select” button



Dumping flash memory – Reading & saving the contents of the SOP8 flash chip


Read the flash memory

1. Click “READ” on the top menu
2. Click “Read” in the Chip Read window
3. Click “BACK” once read is complete



Read the flash memory

4. Click “SAVE” on the top menu
5. Click “Browse” in the Save to file window
6. Locate your preferred location and click “Save”
7. Click “Save As”
8. Click “OK”



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Modifying filesystems – extracting flash contents and modifying files

Extract contents

Using the binwalk^[1] firmware analysis tool we can extract the contents of the flash memory dump.

binwalk attempts to carve out different areas of the binary file into filesystem sections.

Our focus should be on SquashFS and Jefferson filesystems to try and locate interesting files

```
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~/Workspace/firmware
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~/Workspace/firmware$ docker run -it --rm -v $(pwd):/workspace -w /workspace sheabot/binwalk -e hitb-firmware-dump.BIN
DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL  DESCRIPTION
-----
188908      0x2E1EC      CRC32 polynomial table, little endian
193820      0x2F51C      LZ0 compressed data
196044      0x2FDCC      Android booting, kernel size: 0 bytes, kernel addr: 0x70657250, ramdisk size: 543519329 bytes, ramdisk addr: 0x6E72656B, product name: "mem boot start"
262144      0x40000      uImage header, header size: 64 bytes, header CRC: 0xD303C2CB, created: 2023-11-21 09:58:03, image size: 1681989 bytes, Data Address: 0x80010000, Entry Point: 0x8040BED0, data CRC: 0x26E5AB90, OS: Linux, CPU: MIPS, image type: OS Kernel Image, compression type: lzma, image name: "Linux-3.10.14__isvp_pike_1.0__"
262208      0x40040      LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 67108864 bytes, uncompressed size: -1 bytes
2097152     0x200000     Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 965404 bytes, 213 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: 2024-08-15 11:27:45
3080192     0x2F0000     Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 4314274 bytes, 77 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: 2022-01-01 00:00:00
7995392     0x7A0000     JFFS2 filesystem, little endian
```

Modify root password

The shadow file on *nix systems contains local user password hashes. We can change the hash to something we know

```
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted$ tail squashfs-root/etc/shadow
root:$1$soidjfoi$YqVofy88ZPpjWu1nwaQzN1:10933:0:99999:7:::
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted$
```

```
$ openssl passwd -1 -salt [salt] [password]
```

Enable Telnet Access

The telnet daemon is installed but commented in the init.d/rcS script. By removing the # we enable the service

```
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted$ grep -r "telnet" squashfs-root
grep: squashfs-root/bin/busybox: binary file matches
squashfs-root/etc/init.d/rcS:# Start telnet daemon
squashfs-root/etc/init.d/rcS:#telnetd &
pentest@hitb-hv-1: ~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted$
```

Modifying filesystems – extracting and creating Squashfs filesystems to inject into flash binary

Extracting the Squashfs filesystem

The binwalk tool previously extracted the Squashfs filesystems using sasquatch. Let's extract it again using a stand alone binary (unsquash) which we have full control of.

```
pentest@hitb-hv-1:~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted$ cd modified_firmware/
pentest@hitb-hv-1:~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted/modified_firmware$ unsquashfs ../squashfs-root
squashfs-root/ squashfs-root-0/
pentest@hitb-hv-1:~/Workspace/firmware/_hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted/modified_firmware$ unsquashfs ../200000.squashfs
Parallel unsquashfs: Using 4 processors
184 inodes (67 blocks) to write

[=====] 251/251 100%

created 41 files
created 29 directories
created 143 symlinks
created 0 devices
created 0 fifos
created 0 sockets
created 0 hardlinks
```

```
$ unsquash ../200000.squashfs
```

Filesystem parameters

Blocksize and compression type can be obtained from the previously ran binwalk command.

```
2097152 0x200000 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 965404 bytes, 213 inodes, b
locksize: 65536 bytes created: 2024-08-15 11:27:45
3080192 0x2F0000 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:xz, size: 4314274 bytes, 77 inodes, b
locksize: 65536 bytes created: 2022-01-01 00:00:00
```

```
$ binwalk ./firmware
```

Create filesystem

Using the above parameters, we can create a new Squashfs filesystem which closely matches the original.

```
firmware$ mksquashfs squashfs-root/ 200000.squashfs-modified -comp xz -b 65536
Parallel mksquashfs: Using 4 processors
Creating 4.0 filesystem on 200000.squashfs-modified, block size 65536.
[=====/] 67/67 100%
```

```
$ mksquashfs squashfs-root/ 200000-modified.squashfs -comp xz -b 65536
```

Injecting into flash dump

The modified squashfs partition can be injected into the original flash dump using cat and dd.

```
pentest@hitb-hv-1:~/Workspace/firmware$ cp hitb-firmware-dump.BIN hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.original
pentest@hitb-hv-1:~/Workspace/firmware$ cat _hitb-firmware-dump.BIN.extracted/modified_firmware/200000.squashfs-modified | dd co
nv=notrunc of=hitb-firmware-dump.BIN bs=1 seek=$((0x200000))
966656+0 records in
966656+0 records out
966656 bytes (967 kB, 944 KiB) copied, 2.30372 s, 420 kB/s
```


```
$ cat mnt/modified.squashfs | dd conv=notrunc
of=hitb-firmware-dump.bin bs=1 seek=$((0x200000))
```

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Writing filesystem back to chip


Load the flash dump

1. Click "LOAD" on the top menu
2. Click "Browse" in the File load window
3. Locate the dump.bin and click "Open"
4. Click "OK"



Write the dump to the chip



5. Click "PROG" on the top menu
6. Click "Program" in the Chip Program window
7. Click "BACK" once complete




-
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Getting root shell – re-attaching the chip IPcam



Remove DIP8 socket from the Xgeco programmer and connect back to the wiring harness



Getting root shell – telnet if camera no longer broken :/

Root shell here ;-)